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“I was Going to Offer $10,000 but…”:  
The Effects of Phantom Anchors in Negotiation 
 
Abstract 
Negotiators commonly attach phantom anchors—retracted and aggressive figures—to 
their actual and less aggressive offers. For example, a seller might say, “I was going to ask for 
$10,000, but I can offer $8,000.” Drawing from research on anchoring, we predict that offer-
makers will economically benefit from offers with phantom anchors. Drawing from research on 
interpersonal perceptions, we test competing hypotheses indicating that phantom anchors might 
elicit perceptions of manipulativeness or benevolence, with economic implications. Finally, we 
explore situational conditions that could moderate these perceptions. Five studies show that 
negotiators using offers with (versus without) phantom anchors receive less aggressive 
counteroffers and more beneficial agreements in both distributive and integrative negotiations, 
but also seem more manipulative. Situations portraying the phantom anchor-actual offer 
combination as a true concession, however, dampen manipulativeness perceptions. Overall, the 
results suggest that phantom anchors represent a powerful yet risky and understudied value-
claiming strategy in negotiations.   
 




“I was Going to Offer $10,000 but…”:  
The Effects of Phantom Anchors in Negotiation 
One of the most well-known and well-documented decision heuristics is anchoring (Klein 
et al., 2014): a cognitive bias whereby individuals make uncertain judgments by insufficiently 
adjusting from other figures, relevant or irrelevant (“anchors”; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
Anchors influence decisions in a wide variety of domains, including decisions about how much 
to purchase (Wansink, Kent, & Hoch, 1998), what to bid in an auction (Beggs & Graddy, 2009), 
and which investments to choose (Andersen, 2010).  
Anchoring has also been extensively documented in the domain of negotiation. Research 
in this area mostly examines the anchoring effects of first offers, consistently showing that first 
offers exert a strong anchoring effect on counteroffers and final settlement prices (e.g., Adair, 
Weingart, & Brett, 2007; Ames & Mason, 2015; Janiszewski & Uy, 2008; Loschelder, Stuppi, & 
Trötschel, 2014; Schaerer, Loschelder, & Swaab, 2016; Schaerer, Swaab, & Galinsky, 2015; 
Sinaceur, Maddux, Vasiljevic, Nückel, & Galinsky, 2013). Notwithstanding some critical 
boundary conditions identified in the last few years, like the possibility that first offers may 
reveal sensitive information (e.g., Loschelder, Swaab, Trötschel, & Galinsky, 2014; Loschelder, 
Trötschel, Swaab, Friese, & Galinsky, 2016) or disadvantage the first mover in the presence of 
information asymmetry (Maaravi & Data, 2017), first offers generally influence final prices in a 
direction that benefits the offerer. Indeed, this effect holds up despite a number of plausible 
moderators such as cultural context, structure of the negotiation, or power differentials (Gunia, 
Swaab, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2013; Barry, Lewicki, & Saunders, 2015). This robust effect 
apparently emerges because negotiators across cultures and contexts cognitively anchor on the 
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first offer, making counteroffers and agreeing to settlement prices that assimilate to the first offer 
across various circumstances (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001).  
Although anchoring effects have mainly been studied in the context of single-issue first 
offers (cf. Gunia et al., 2013), past work suggests that other numerical values in a negotiation 
may also influence subsequent offers (Whyte & Sebenius, 1997). For example, recipients of 
range offers (e.g. “I want $7200-$7600”) anchor on both ends of the range when making 
counteroffers (Ames & Mason, 2015). Moreover, negotiators often anchor on their poor 
alternatives, making weak offers reflective of their low-power positions (Schaerer, et. al, 2015). 
The current research highlights another potentially important numerical figure that could 
influence negotiators’ judgments: a phantom anchor, by which we mean a retracted and 
aggressive figure attached to a real and less aggressive offer. For example, a car seller might say: 
“I was going to ask for $10,000, but I can offer $8,000.” In this case, $10,000 represents the 
phantom anchor and $8,000 the real offer. We suggest that that the phantom anchor could 
influence the buyer’s judgments despite its retraction. Indeed, the phantom anchor could be 
especially potent if the seller added an explanation such as: “because I like you” or “because I 
don’t feel like haggling.” While not a necessary component of every phantom anchor, such an 
explanation could help justify the phantom anchor’s unavailability (Gunia, Pinkley, & Bhatia, 
2018; but also see Maaravi, Ganzach, & Pazy, 2011). 
Phantom choice options (i.e. options “that look real but are unavailable at the time a 
decision is made”; Pratkanis & Farquhar, 1992, p. 105) have been documented in many types of 
judgment contexts, including those that involve decoy values (Farquhar & Pratkanis, 1987; 
Pettibone & Wedell, 2007), counterfactual thinking (Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1990) and 
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delay of gratification (Mischel, 1974)1, but theory and research on their effects in negotiation is 
limited. Theoretically, Lax and Sebenius (2006) described similar phenomena in the form of 
“flexible but extreme offers” and “non-offer offers,” meaning indirectly relevant statements or 
figures that negotiators can mention to justify extreme offers. Empirical research on phantom 
alternatives, in turn, has mainly focused on the unavailable alternatives that negotiators may have 
in their minds (Pinkley, 1995; Pinkley, Conlon, Sawyer, Sleesman, Vandewalle & Kuenzi, 
2017). More broadly exploring phantom choice options in negotiation is the goal of the current 
research. Our main prediction is that offers containing phantom anchors will elicit more 
favorable counteroffers and final agreements for offerers than offers without phantom anchors. 
The logic for this prediction is as follows.  
Past research on anchoring in non-negotiation situations shows that anchors that are not 
directly relevant to the decision can still have potent effects. In one of the most well-known 
demonstrations, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) asked participants to judge the percentage of 
African countries in the United Nations against a low (10%) or high (65%) anchor. Although 
these anchors came from the ostensible spin of a wheel with no relevance to judgments about 
Africa, the anchors nevertheless influenced such judgments strongly: participants who received 
the high anchor estimated the percentage of African nations in the United Nations to be higher 
than those who received the low anchor. This is just one example. More or less relevant anchors 
have been shown to influence decisions in many other contexts, ranging from consumer 
purchasing decisions (Wansink, et al., 1998) to judicial verdicts (Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 
                                                          
1 It is perhaps useful to note that the literature on phantom choice options appears agnostic as to the reason behind 
the disappearance of the phantom option from the choice set. That is, the phantom option may be unavailable at the 
time of the decision for any reason. In this paper, we explore the specific situation in which the phantom option is 
unavailable because the offerer has retracted it. 
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2006) to real estate transactions (Northcraft & Neale, 1987). Indeed, a recent many-labs 
replication deemed anchoring one of the strongest psychological effects (Klein et al., 2014).  
Similarly, in negotiation, even when a numerical anchor is demonstrably unreliable, it 
can affect important negotiation parameters. For example, Whyte and Sebenius (1997) provided 
negotiators with an anchor indicating the amount their counterpart might be willing to pay. Yet, 
this anchor was then portrayed as a misunderstanding arising from the use of a foreign language 
translator who was difficult to understand—a fact that would seem to cast doubt on the anchor’s 
reliability and relevance to subsequent judgments. Nevertheless, the anchor significantly 
influenced first offers as well as reservation and target prices. Effects like these presumably 
occur because people who hear an anchor and then need to make an ambiguous judgment have a 
hard time “unhearing” the anchor. It stays in their working memory even if they explicitly try to 
dismiss it (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987), and thus they incorporate it into their 
judgments.  
If irrelevant anchors can influence judgments so strongly, we predict that phantom 
anchors, which do provide some marginally relevant information about the offerer’s initial 
intentions, will too. To test this prediction, we generally compare the effects of offers containing 
phantom anchors (e.g., “I was going to ask for $10,000, but I can offer $8,000”) against the 
effects of offers with the same available figure ($8,000) but no phantom anchor. Given the 
predicted anchoring effect of the retracted and aggressive figure ($10,000), we expect that offers 
with phantom anchors will lead the counterpart to make less aggressive counteroffers and agree 
to less aggressive final prices (benefitting the negotiator who used the phantom anchor): 
Hypothesis 1: Offers with (versus without) phantom anchors will lead to more 
economically favorable counteroffers and final prices from the offerer’s perspective.  
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Phantom anchors and interpersonal perceptions 
While the anchoring effects of offers on subsequent offers are certainly important, recent 
work also studies the effects of offers on interpersonal perceptions, which matter because they 
can influence whether negotiators implement an agreement or want to deal with one another 
again (Mislin, Campagna, & Bottom, 2011)—and because of their impact on subsequent offers 
(e.g., Loschelder, et al., 2014). Much of the research on the interpersonal effects of offers focuses 
on the way offers are made. For example, precise versus round first offers suggest that the offerer 
is knowledgeable and thus elicit more favorable counteroffers (Loschelder et al., 2014; Mason, 
Lee, Wiley, & Ames, 2013). Additionally, negotiators who add arguments to their first offers are 
seen as attempting to persuade their counterparts versus provide information, and subsequently 
receive more aggressive counteroffers (Maaravi, et al., 2011). Finally, the rationale attached to 
an offer can influence perceptions of the offerer’s limits and trustworthiness, with implications 
for both relational and instrumental outcomes (Lee & Ames, 2017).  
Building on this line of research, we argue that, whatever their anchoring benefits, 
phantom anchors may also influence offer-recipients’ perceptions of the offerer, which could 
exacerbate or dampen any anchoring effects on economic outcomes. Interpersonal perceptions 
could exacerbate anchoring effects, increasing the economic influence of offers with phantom 
anchors, if offer recipients see the combination of a phantom anchor and actual offer as an 
indication of the offerer’s benevolence. Given that the phantom anchor is less attractive to offer 
recipients than the actual offer that immediately follows it, offer recipients could see the actual 
offer as an attempt to benefit them or treat them favorably, i.e., as a signal of benevolence. Since 
perceptions of benevolence signal trustworthiness (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995) and 
negotiators tend to reciprocate their counterparts’ trustworthy behavior (Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle 
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1998; Gunia, Brett, Nandkeolyar, & Kamdar, 2011; Putnam & Jones, 1982; Weingart, 
Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990), it is plausible that offer recipients could respond to 
offers with phantom anchors by making substantive concessions of their own. In other words, 
theory provides reason to suspect that the interpersonal perception of benevolence could 
exacerbate the anchoring effects of offers with phantom anchors. This suggests the first part of a 
competing hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a: Offers with (versus without) phantom anchors will lead to heightened 
perceptions of benevolence, which will exacerbate the anchoring effects of these offers.  
At the same time, negotiators often come to the bargaining table assuming that their 
interests are diametrically opposed to their counterpart’s (Thompson & Hastie, 1992). This zero-
sum mindset often leads both negotiators to view each other’s behavior with skepticism 
(Sinaceur, 2010), especially when that behavior seems to betray a lack of trustworthiness (Gunia 
et al., 2011). Indeed, since negotiators with sufficient opportunity and motive resort to lies 
almost half the time (Schweitzer & Croson, 1999) and negotiations are rife with unethical 
behavior (Gaspar & Schweitzer, 2013), such beliefs may be somewhat founded. In the context of 
offers with phantom anchors, this reasoning suggests that offer recipients may perceive such 
offers not as benevolent attempts to help them, but as malevolent attempts to manipulate them.  
Although practitioner-oriented articles have shown a strong interest in manipulative 
negotiation behaviors and how to counteract them (Adler, 2007; John, 2016),2 research on the 
specific tactics that negotiators perceive as manipulative is scarce, with the exception of some 
recent work. This work suggests that negotiators who emphasize the costliness of a concession to 
                                                          





themselves are seen as more manipulative and subsequently receive less favorable counteroffers 
than negotiators who emphasize how the concession benefits the counterpart (Bhatia, Chow, & 
Weingart, 2018). Other work suggests that the addition of arguments to offers generates the 
perception that a negotiator is trying to manipulate through persuasion (Maaravi et al., 2011).  
Following this nascent line of work, we suggest that the addition of phantom anchors to 
offers could generate perceptions of manipulativeness. If the retracted figure (e.g., $10,000) is no 
longer current, why was it mentioned? If the less aggressive figure (e.g., $8,000) is now 
available, why wasn’t it available when the offerer initially formulated an offer? In a context 
riddled with skepticism, perceptions that the other party is being manipulative provide an easy 
answer. Thus, as a competing hypothesis, we consider whether offers with phantom anchors 
could generate negative interpersonal perceptions of manipulativeness, which could readily 
dampen the anchoring effects of such offers:  
Hypothesis 2b: Offers with (versus without) phantom anchors will lead to heightened 
perceptions of manipulativeness, which will dampen the anchoring effects of these offers. 
Beyond the possibility that phantom anchors may have a direct effect on interpersonal 
perceptions, we consider situational conditions that might moderate these perceptions, 
particularly by increasing positive (Hypothesis 2a) and/or decreasing negative perceptions 
(Hypothesis 2b). Since our predictions about interpersonal perceptions really come down to the 
perceived intent of the offerer—namely, whether the offerer is seeking to make a true concession 
that helps or a fake concession that manipulates the offer recipient, we investigate a set of 
situational conditions that could shed light on the true versus fake nature of the concession: the 
presence of objective standards, competitiveness of the negotiation situation, and bolstering 
versus backdown format of the offer (Ames & Mason, 2015).  
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To consider each briefly, since the publishing of Getting to Yes (Fisher & Ury, 1981), 
negotiation scholars have suggested that objective standards—independent valuations indicating 
a fair or appropriate value in a negotiation—serve to justify offers and portray them as 
appropriate. In the current context, it stands to reason that the presence of an objective standard 
that matches the phantom anchor (versus the absence of such a standard) should justify the 
validity of the phantom anchor and thus make the actual offer seem like a true concession. 
Likewise, negotiation scholars have long suggested that the competitiveness versus 
cooperativeness of the situation serves as a lens through which negotiators interpret each other’s 
behavior (Pinkley, 1990; 1992; Schweitzer & DeChurch, 2001). In the current context, we would 
predict that an overtly cooperative (versus competitive) negotiation setting may cast the 
combination of the phantom anchor and actual offer in a positive light. In particular, a 
cooperative negotiation context may frame an offer with a phantom anchor as indicative of a true 
concession. Finally, Ames and Mason (2015) recently studied range offers (e.g., a seller’s offer 
of $7200-$7600), distinguishing between bolstering and backdown offers (among others). In a 
bolstering offer, a negotiator intends to make less ambitious offer (e.g., $7200) but attaches a 
more ambitious figure to it (e.g., $7600). In a backdown offer, a negotiator intends to make a 
more ambitious offer (e.g., $7600) but attaches a less ambitious figure to it (e.g., $7200). 
Consistent with this framework, we suggest that offers with phantom anchors should seem more 
like true concessions when they take the form of a backdown (versus bolstering) range—that is, 
when the offerer’s true intended offer is known to match the phantom anchor versus the actual 
offer. In that situation, the actual offer should logically seem like a more benevolent and/or less 
manipulative attempt to concede to the counterpart. In sum, we posit three situational 
conditions—objective standards, cooperative negotiation contexts, and backdown formats—that 
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could make offers with phantom anchors seem more benevolent and/or less manipulative 
(depending on which part of the competing hypothesis is supported) by portraying the offer’s 
behavior as a true concession: 
Hypothesis 3: Objective standards, cooperative negotiation contexts, and backdown 
formats will moderate the interpersonal perceptions associated with offers with phantom 
anchors, making them seem more benevolent and/or less manipulative.  
Taken together, our predictions suggest the moderated mediation model in Figure 1. The 
model predicts that phantom anchors will lead to increased anchoring, but this effect will be 
exacerbated or attenuated depending on whether these offers are perceived as benevolent or 
manipulative, which may in turn depend on situational conditions portraying the combination of 
a phantom anchor and an actual offer as a true or fake concession.  
Overview of Studies 
To address the obvious question of whether phantom anchors represent a real and 
common phenomenon, we start by presenting two studies (Studies 1a and 1b) in which 
professional salespeople report their experiences with phantom anchors, and negotiation 
transcripts are coded for the natural occurrence of phantom anchors. We then present the results 
of seven additional studies (described as four for brevity; i.e., as Studies 2-5) that collectively 
test all of the relationships in our moderated mediation model. Study 2 examines the effect of 
phantom anchors on counteroffers in an online study. Studies 3a and 3b test this effect in face-to-
face negotiations, both distributive and integrative, and explore how phantom anchors impact 
settlement values. Study 4 seeks to replicate the economic effects of phantom anchors and also 
focuses on interpersonal perceptions of benevolence and manipulativeness. Studies 5a, 5b and 5c 
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test our full moderated mediation model. Across all studies, we report all measures collected, and 
exclusionary criteria are detailed in the study methods.  
Study 1 
We first conducted a two-part study to assess whether phantom anchors represent a real 
negotiation strategy that actual negotiators use without prompting. In Study 1a, a panel of 
individuals who presumably negotiate often—salespeople—were asked to estimate the 
percentage of negotiations in which they use offers with phantom anchors, as well as the 
percentage of negotiations in which they make concessions (as a comparison). In Study 1b, two 
coders read through a set of negotiation transcripts and indicated how often negotiators 
spontaneously used offers with phantom anchors. 
Study 1a Method 
Participants and design. 50 practicing salespeople were recruited from Qualtrics 
Research platform (Mage=49.8 SDage=15.3, 40% women) to participate in a 15-minute study for 
compensation (as determined by Qualtrics). The study did not include any manipulated variables.  
Procedure.  
Participants answered a set of questions for unrelated research projects. Near the end of 
the study, they answered two questions pertaining to the current research. The first said: “When 
selling a product or service, salespeople often negotiate with buyers. One negotiation strategy 
salespeople might use is to make an offer that indicates the price they were initially planning to 
charge, followed by the price they are actually going to charge. For example, they might say, ‘I 
was initially going to ask for $12,000, but I can do $10,000.’ In what percentage of your 
negotiations do you use this strategy?” (0-100% in 10% increments). They then answered the 
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same question about the following statement: “Another strategy salespeople might use is to make 
an aggressive first offer but later make a concession. For example, they might initially say, ‘I'm 
asking for $12,000.’ Then, later in the negotiation, they might say, ‘I can do $10,000.’” 
Participants completed the study by answering a set of demographic questions. 
Study 1a Results and Discussion 
Supporting our assumption that these participants negotiate often, they reported 
negotiating an average of 17.2 times (SD=22.71) per month. Participants indicated that they 
make offers with phantom anchors in 29.88% (SD=30.10) and concessions in 37.26% 
(SD=30.80) of their negotiations. A planned comparison indicated that the latter did not differ 
significantly from the former, t (49) = 1.54, p=0.13, d=0.24. This suggests that offers with 
phantom anchors occur fairly often among experienced negotiators. 
Study 1b Method 
Participants and design. The data came from another study in which individuals 
negotiated in the lab, and their negotiation sessions were recorded and transcribed. In that study, 
one hundred and sixty-four participants (82 dyads) from a research participant pool maintained 
by a Mid-Atlantic U.S. university conducted a distributive negotiation over the sale of a 
biotechnology plant (the Biopharm-Seltek case; www.negotiationexercises.com). The 
participants were members of the public in the city where the study was conducted and did not 
have any formal training on negotiation, nor instruction in phantom anchors. They ranged from 




In the current study, we began by asking two coders (two master’s students, both blind to 
the study hypotheses) to read both sides of the negotiation case. We then trained them to identify 
offers containing phantom anchors, defined as, “An offer containing a ‘would-be’ or aspirational 
figure in negotiation.” Additionally, we explained that an offer with a phantom anchor “contains 
two numerical offers, e.g., ‘I was planning on asking for $12K for the car but I am okay with 
$10K,’” providing several examples. Since this was a qualitative study intended to identify when 
and how the focal phenomenon emerges in real negotiations, we also asked the coders to identify 
whether the phantom anchor was contained in a first or subsequent offer as well as whether the 
buyer or seller made the offer.   
After this training session, each coder read and coded the same 20 transcripts 
independently, noting the number of offers containing phantom anchors in each transcript and 
recording the information above. Following a meeting to discuss ambiguous cases and resolve 
disagreements, the coders then independently coded the remaining 62 transcripts (initial κ=0.83). 
Finally, they met to resolve any remaining disagreements. Ultimately, the coders reached 
agreement on the statements constituting phantom anchors in each transcript.  
Study 1b Results and Discussion 
The coding indicated that offers with phantom anchors occurred in 29 of the 82 
negotiations (35.8%); the average number of such offers in each negotiation was 0.46, with a 
maximum of 4. In the 29 negotiations containing offers with phantom anchors, these offers were 
made by sellers but not buyers 41.4% of the time, buyers but not sellers another 41.4% of the 
time (i.e., the same number of times), and both buyers and sellers the remaining 17.2% of the 
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time. In five of the negotiations containing phantom anchors (17.22%), these anchors appeared in 
a first offer; in the remaining negotiations, the phantom anchor appeared in subsequent offers3.  
These results again suggest that phantom anchors are common, emerging unprompted 
from negotiators who were not trained in their use (or negotiation in general). Furthermore, the 
results shed some light on the way that negotiators tend to use offers with phantom anchors. It 
seems as if sellers and buyers use phantom anchors with similar frequency. Their phantom 
anchors sometimes appear in their first offers, but more often appear later. Although the primary 
goal of this study was to establish the validity of the construct, we return to some of these 
interesting nuances in the general discussion. Having established the unprompted use of phantom 
anchors, the remainder of our studies examine their economic and interpersonal effects.  
Study 2 
Study 2 examined the economic effects of offers with phantom anchors (Hypothesis 1), 
asking online participants to imagine themselves conducting a used car negotiation. We 
examined the relationship between phantom anchors or their absence and counteroffers. 
Method 
Participants and design. The study manipulated one variable, between-subjects: offer 
type (phantom anchor present versus phantom anchor absent). An a priori power analysis using 
G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), based on a medium effect size (d=.50), 
suggested that power (1-β) = 0.80 would be achieved for a one-tailed t-test by recruiting 102 
                                                          
3 Since phantom anchors appeared in a minority of negotiations and functioned as first offers in a minority of 




participants4. We sought to exceed that amount by recruiting 120, from Amazon’s MTurk 
system. Our participants were located in the United States and ranged from 19 to 63 in age 
(M=33.15, SD=10.95, 43 % women); they were paid $0.40 for their participation.  
Procedure. 
 All participants were told to imagine that they were selling their car, which was presented 
as a well-maintained model with low mileage that was likely to sell for $9,500-$13,500. They 
were informed that they had placed advertisements online, had been contacted by several buyers, 
and were now meeting one of the buyers face-to-face to negotiate the price.  
Manipulated and measured variables. 
Offer type manipulation. We manipulated the way the buyer made an offer to the 
participant, i.e., the seller. To participants in the phantom anchor present condition, the buyer 
said: “Although I was originally going to offer you $10,000, I am willing to pay $11,000 because 
you seem like a nice person and the car is in good condition.” To participants in the phantom 
anchor absent condition, the buyer said: “I am willing to pay $11,000 because you seem like a 
nice person and the car is in good condition.”  
Counteroffer. Participants were asked to provide a counteroffer. 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analysis. Three participants failed the attention check questions embedded 
in the survey and were excluded from any further analyses, leaving 117 participants. Gender and 
age did not moderate the effects reported in this or the other studies and thus will not be 
discussed further.  
Main analysis. 
                                                          
4 We used this power analysis as a benchmark for determining the minimum sample size for the subsequent studies 
in which participants did not come from a convenience sample. 
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Counteroffer. We predicted that offers with phantom anchors would elicit less aggressive 
counteroffers than offers without them. Since the person responding to the offers (i.e., the 
participant) was a seller, less aggressive counteroffers (from their perspective) would be 
indicated by lower values. To test the prediction, we coded the offer type variable as phantom 
anchor absent condition=-1, phantom anchor present condition=1. We then conducted a one-
way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with offer type as the independent and participants’ 
counteroffer amount as the dependent variable. Results revealed a significant difference across 
the two conditions, F (1,114) = 3.83, p=0.05 (exactly), d=0.36, such that offers with phantom 
anchors elicited less aggressive counteroffers (Mphantom present=11,688.60, SDphantom present=861.01) 
than offers without phantom anchors (Mphantom absent=12,012.69, SDphantom absent=920.81). Put 
differently, offer recipients (our participants) who received an offer with a phantom anchor made 
a counteroffer that was less advantageous to themselves. These findings provide initial evidence 
for Hypothesis 1 that offers with versus without phantom anchors elicit more favorable 
counteroffers for offerers and less favorable counteroffers for offer recipients.  
In drawing these conclusions, it is important to note that this and the next study test 
Hypothesis 1 but provide little or no information about Hypothesis 2. In other words, phantom 
anchors could be eliciting perceptions of benevolence (which could be exacerbating the 
anchoring effect), perceptions of manipulativeness (which could be dampening the anchoring 
effect), both, or neither. Studies 4-5 will turn to these perceptions.  
Study 3 
 Study 3 is a two-part study that again explores the economic influence of phantom 
anchors. It extends our findings to face-to-face negotiations, a different participant group 
(students), negotiated outcomes such as settlement values, and an integrative negotiation context. 
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In Study 3a, participants conducted a similar distributive negotiation over a used car; in Study 
3b, they conducted an integrative negotiation over a restaurant rental space. In both contexts, we 
continued to predict that negotiators using offers with phantom anchors would obtain more 
favorable individual-level outcomes than those using offers without phantom anchors.  
In a negotiation with integrative potential, another important outcome is the total value 
that negotiators create across the dyad, which is computed by adding the two sides’ individual 
gains. Negotiators increase joint gains through information sharing, which helps them realize 
efficient trade-offs. Although offers still anchor outcomes in integrative negotiations (Gunia et 
al., 2013), research shows that interpersonal perceptions can also influence joint outcomes by 
facilitating or reducing information sharing (Gunia et al., 2011). As an initial hint about the 
validity of Hypotheses 2a vs. 2b (tested in Studies 4-5), we would expect joint gains to be higher 
if phantom anchors were perceived as benevolent and lower if perceived as manipulative.  
Study 3a Method 
Participants and design. Participants were 106 Master of Science students with ages 
ranging from 20 to 26 (M=22.57, SD=1.65, 49 % women) from a private, European university. 
They were a diverse group representing 17 nations. They participated in the study as a class 
exercise. Similar to Study 2, offer type (phantom anchor present versus phantom anchor absent) 
was manipulated in a between-subjects design, this time at the dyadic level.  
Procedure. 
 Participants were randomly assigned to the role of buyer or seller in a short car sale 
negotiation. They were also randomly assigned to their negotiation dyad. They received and had 
15 minutes to read their materials in preparation for the negotiation. Participants in the buyer role 
received instructions informing them that they needed to buy a new car and had two prospects, 
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both of which were the same make and model. The first car was in good condition, but its seller 
refused to budge from €10,000. The second car was also in good condition but slightly older. 
Buyers were told that the market price for the second car was €8000-€9000. Finally, they learned 
that they were about to meet the seller of this second car to negotiate the price.  
 Similarly, participants in the seller role read that they had two potential buyers for the car 
they were trying to sell, which was also presented as having an €8000-€9000 market value. The 
first potential buyer had made a final offer of €7000. Sellers were now meeting the second 
potential buyer face-to-face to negotiate the price. We included information on the Best 
Alternative to Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) for both negotiators because this study was 
conducted in the classroom with a convenience sample. Following the literature’s 
recommendation that data collection should not interfere with student learning (Loyd, Kern, & 
Thompson, 2005), we made sure not to overlook the important concept of BATNA. 
Manipulated and measured variables. 
Offer type manipulation. Given our access to a relatively small sample and to avoid 
potential role effects (Neale, Northcraft, & Huber, 1987), we gave the manipulation materials to 
only one side: the seller. The manipulation was delivered via an “Important Message for the 
Seller.” Sellers first read: “In negotiation, it is recommended that you make the first offer 
because aggressive first offers lead to better economic outcomes. However, negotiation 
practitioners and scholars point out that HOW you make the first offer also matters.” Then, 
sellers in the phantom anchor present condition read: “A recommended strategy for making first 
offers is the following: Determine your intended first offer. Before making this offer, make it 
sound like you planned to make a higher, more aggressive offer and follow it immediately 
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with your actual first offer. For example, you might say, “I had planned to sell the car for 
€12,000, but I can do €11,000.”  
Sellers in the phantom anchor absent condition read: “A recommended strategy for 
making first offers is the following: make an offer that is short and focused on a single number. 
For example, you might say, “I can sell the car for €11,000.” Finally, sellers in both conditions 
were told that this was just an example and that they could implement the strategy in any way 
that fits this description. Buyers did not receive instructions about offers.  
While Study 1 indicated that phantom anchors occur more often in counteroffers (and a 
number of our other studies manipulated phantom anchors that way), the current study focused 
on first offers for three reasons. First, Study 1b indicated that phantom anchors do arise in first 
offers, so we wanted to determine whether the predicted effects generalize to first offers. Second, 
we sought to maximize comparability with the large literature on anchoring in negotiations, 
which has focused on first offers. Third, since this literature indicates that counteroffers are 
strongly influenced by first offers, it was methodologically cleaner to manipulate phantom 
anchors as part of first offers. Otherwise, the actual numbers in the phantom anchors (or regular 
anchors) that emerged in this study would have been highly variable.  
First offer, Counteroffer, and Settlement Price. We provided participants with an 
agreement sheet on which they reported who made the first offer and the amounts of the first 
offer, counteroffer, and settlement price.  
Study 3a Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses. 
 Means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations for this study are reported in Table 
1. Our 106 participants were organized into 53 negotiation dyads. As noted, participants in the 
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seller role were instructed to make the first offer in accordance with their condition. However, in 
examining the agreement sheets, we learned that the buyers actually made the first offer in nine 
dyads. Since we cannot know whether these buyers used offers with or without phantom anchors, 
we excluded these dyads from further analyses (leading to lower degrees of freedom in the 
analyses below). No other dyads were excluded.   
Offer magnitude. We first wanted to make sure that the offer type condition did not 
influence the magnitude of participants’ offers. To do that, we coded the offer type variable as 
phantom anchor absent condition=-1, phantom anchor present condition=1 and performed a 
one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), with offer type as the independent and participants’ 
first offer as the dependent variable. Results were not significant, F (1, 42) = 0.85, p=0.36.  
Main analysis. 
Counteroffer. We predicted that offers with phantom anchors would elicit less aggressive 
counteroffers than offers without phantom anchors. Since the negotiator responding to the offers 
was a buyer, less aggressive counteroffers (from their perspective) would be indicated by higher 
values. Given the strong relationship between first offers and counteroffers (r=0.43, p=0.001), 
we controlled for the magnitude of the first offer in our analysis of counteroffers. We conducted 
a univariate ANCOVA with the offer type as the independent, the counteroffer amount as the 
dependent, and first offers as the control variable. This analysis revealed a significant difference, 
where offers with phantom anchors led to less aggressive counteroffers, F (1, 42) = 4.15, p 
=0.048, d=0.23, Mphantom present=8022.73, SDphantom present=957.44; Mphantom absent=7452.38, SDphantom 
absent=804.75 than offers without them. 
Final price. To examine the effect of offer type on settlement prices, we ran a parallel 
ANCOVA. Results indicated a significant difference, F (1, 42) = 5.72, p = 0.032, d=0.61, 
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Mphantom present=8967.35, SDphantom present=633.82; Mphantom absent=8469.05, SDphantom absent=746.91, 
indicating that sellers using the phantom anchor strategy sold their cars for a significantly higher 
price (achieved a better economic outcome) than those who did not use this strategy5.  
 Study 3a showed, in a face-to-face negotiation that offers with versus without phantom 
anchors lead to less aggressive counteroffers and more favorable settlement prices. These results 
reveal that the economic advantage of phantom anchors extends to a different set of participants, 
from counteroffers to settlement prices, and from hypothetical to real negotiations. We find 
Study 3a particularly noteworthy given its context: The data were collected outside the United 
States among participants representing many cultural and national backgrounds. The persistence 
of the “phantom anchor effect” in this context is consistent with similar findings regarding the 
robustness of anchoring effects across cultures (Gunia et al., 2013). Next, we sought to extend 
our inquiry to integrative negotiations. 
Study 3b Method 
Participants and design. Participants were a convenience sample of 92 undergraduate 
students enrolled in an introductory behavioral economics course at a Mid-Atlantic U.S. 
university. They completed the study as a classroom exercise during a guest lecture on 
negotiation. Prior to the session in which data were collected, participants had no formal training 
on the topic. Due to the short duration of the lecture (80 minutes) and our desire to ensure the 
data collection did not interfere with learning (Loyd et al., 2005), our ability to administer 
surveys was limited. Thus, we were only able to collect an agreement sheet, meaning we do not 
have demographic information on the participants but expect them to be similar to the typical 
                                                          
5 Results for both sets of analyses were the same when the magnitude of the first offer was not included a control 
variable; counteroffer: F (1, 42) = 4.45, p =0.041; final price: F (1, 42) = 5.72, p =0.021. 
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student body in a private university in the region. The study manipulated one variable, between-
subjects, at the dyadic level: offer type (phantom anchor present versus phantom anchor absent). 
Procedure. 
 After a brief introduction to negotiation, participants received their role materials, which 
randomly assigned them to the role of a restaurant space owner or a representative of a restaurant 
chain. The exercise was loosely based on the Dispute Resolution Research Center’s More 
Growth for Tonto (www.negotiationexercises.com) and involved the rental of a restaurant space. 
The scenario included one distributive issue, price per square foot, and two trade-off issues, date 
of first rent payment and duration of the lease. All issues were quantified with points, thus 
clarifying the extent to which participants valued the issues. The structure of the negotiation was 
such that the rental space owner valued the date of the first rent payment more than the duration 
of the lease, whereas the restaurant chain representative held the reverse preference ordering. 
This structure meant that if the negotiators were able to uncover these priorities, they could make 
efficient trade-offs and reach a pareto efficient outcome. The distributive issue afforded both 
sides the most points and was thus the most important issue. 
 In addition to the general negotiation information, the restaurant space owner’s role 
materials contained our manipulation, presented as “Important Negotiation Instructions” 
(detailed below). After receiving their role materials, participants had 10 minutes to prepare for 
the negotiation. Once they were ready, they randomly paired up with a participant of the opposite 
role and had a maximum of 15 minutes to conduct the negotiation. When they were done, they 
filled out an agreement sheet, which contained our measures.  
Manipulated and measured variables. 
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Offer type manipulation. Similar to Study 3a, we had access to a small sample and thus 
administered our manipulation to one side only, the restaurant space owner. Space owners were 
instructed to make the first offer, and representatives of the restaurant chain were instructed to let 
their counterparts make the first offer. Rationales for these instructions were provided to both 
sides. Additionally, restaurant space owners in the phantom anchor present condition read: 
“A recommended strategy for making first offers is the following: Determine your 
intended first offer. Before making this offer, make it sound like you planned to make 
a higher, more aggressive offer and follow it immediately with your actual first 
offer. For example, you might say, ‘I had planned to offer you X, but I can do Y.’ In this 
example, X would be the higher offer and Y would be your actual first offer.”  
Restaurant space owners in the phantom anchor absent condition read: “A recommended 
strategy for making first offers is the following: make an offer that is short and focused. For 
example, you might say, ‘I offer you X.’” Our instructions referenced variables like “X” and 
“Y” instead of figures because we did not want to influence whether participants made a single- 
or multi-issue offer in this multi-issue negotiation. We chose to embed the phantom anchor 
manipulation in the first offer for the same reasons as in Study 3a. 
First offer and Settlement Value. We provided participants with an agreement sheet on 
which they reported who made the first offer and the amounts of the first offer and settlement 
value for each issue.  




 Means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations of variables for this study are 
reported in Table 2. Our 92 participants formed 46 negotiation dyads, of which two impassed 
and were excluded. We conducted all subsequent analysis on the remaining 44 dyads. 
First offer. It is interesting to note that restaurant space owners in 24 dyads (more than 
half) made multi-issue first offers. Participants in eight dyads did not indicate the amount of the 
first offer. The remaining 12 made single-issue offers, predominantly on the distributive issue of 
price per square feet6. We believe that the high incidence of multi-issue offers is noteworthy 
because it may mean that the effect of phantom anchors was spread across all issues (if the first 
offer involves all three issues, the phantom anchor probably would too). 
Main analysis. 
Joint outcome. To test the effect of phantom anchors on joint outcomes, we first 
computed individual gain for each dyad member by adding the point values corresponding to the 
issues in the final settlement. Next, we added the two negotiators’ individual gains to compute 
the dyad’s joint gains. We then coded the independent variable as phantom anchor absent 
condition =-1 and phantom anchor present condition =1. Results of a one-way ANOVA with 
offer type as the independent and joint gains as the dependent variable did not indicate 
significant differences across the two conditions, F (1, 42) = 1.64, p =0.21, though dyads with 
phantom anchors descriptively created less value than those without phantom anchors, Mphantom 
present=9695.24, SDphantom present=736.53; Mphantom absent=9947.83, SDphantom absent=569.58. 
Individual outcome. Next, we examined individual outcomes, i.e., how much of the total 
value created in the dyad was claimed by each side. Given the persistent effect of phantom 
anchors on distributive (i.e., individual) economic outcomes, we expected participants who used 
                                                          
6 The occurrence of multi- vs. single-issue offers did not differ across the phantom anchor present versus phantom 
anchor absent conditions, X2=0.52, p=0.47. 
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phantom anchors to obtain better individual outcomes than those who did not. Since dyads in an 
integrative context create varying joint value, the appropriate measure of distributive outcomes 
in this setting is the percentage of total value claimed. Thus, we first computed a “value-
claimed” variable by dividing each negotiator’s individual outcome by the dyad’s joint gains. We 
then reran the above one-way ANOVA on this variable and found that restaurant space owners 
who were instructed to make offers using phantom anchors claimed significantly more value 
than those who were not instructed to use phantom anchors, F (1, 42) = 4.52, p =0.04, d=0.57, 
Mphantom present=0.58, SDphantom present=0.08; Mphantom absent=0.53 SDphantom absent=0.06.  
Study 3b examined phantom anchors in a face-to-face negotiation with integrative 
potential. Our findings indicate that the value-claiming advantage of phantom anchors extends to 
negotiations with integrative potential: negotiators using phantom anchors claimed more of the 
negotiation pie than those who did not. Moreover, we did not observe a detrimental effect of 
phantom anchors on joint gains: dyads using phantom anchors did not create significantly less 
value than those who did not (though our sample size was relatively small).  
Collectively, Study 3a and 3b reveal that the phantom anchor advantage emerges when 
the anchor appears in a first offer, in accordance with the large literature on first offers in 
negotiation. While the use of first offers to manipulate phantom anchors is a weakness of these 
studies in that this apparently occurs less often in real life (according to Study 1b), we also 
consider the current results useful for demonstrating the generalizability of the effect and 
connecting our work to the first offers literature. Notably, these studies go beyond a mere 
replication of the anchoring effect by showing that phantom anchors “anchor better” than the 
normal first offers against which we compared them. 
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 Our overall model posits that phantom anchors also generate positive (benevolent) or 
negative (manipulative) interpersonal perceptions, which could exacerbate or dampen anchoring 
effects, respectively. Our remaining studies continue to measure economic outcomes but focus 
on these interpersonal perceptions and situational factors that could moderate them.  
Study 4 
Study 4 focuses on interpersonal perceptions resulting from phantom anchors:  
specifically, perceptions of benevolence (Hypothesis 2a) and manipulativeness (Hypothesis 2b). 
To do so, a different online sample reacted to the same negotiation scenario as in Study 2. 
Additionally, this study sought to test an alternative explanation for any interpersonal 
perceptions arising from offers with phantom anchors: that such perceptions derive not from the 
form or “phantomness” of the offers but rather from their extremity (i.e., the fact that they 
include a relatively extreme figure). To test this alternative explanation, we included extreme and 
moderate versions of offers with and without phantom anchors. If the alternative explanation 
holds, then the more extreme combination of the phantom anchor and actual offer should be seen 
as less benevolent and/or more manipulative than the moderate combination. If not, then both 
combinations should generate similar interpersonal perceptions.  
Method 
Participants and design. We advertised the study on Prolific Academic for 440 
participants but ended up with 441 (Mage=33.32, SDage=12.09, 44% women). Participants were 
all located in the United States, were native speakers of English and received $0.95 for their 
participation. The study had a 2 (offer type: phantom present versus phantom absent) x 2 (offer 




 The procedure was identical to Study 2’s with two exceptions: 1) participants answered 
additional questions (see below), and 2) we manipulated the extremity of the phantom anchor. 
Manipulated and measured variables. 
Offer type and offer magnitude manipulations. Our manipulations were very similar to 
the previous two studies, and our two independent variables led to four conditions. In the 
phantom anchor present-extreme condition, the buyer said: “Although I was originally going to 
offer you $10,000, I am willing to pay $11,000”; in the phantom anchor present-moderate 
condition: “Although I was originally going to offer you $11,000, I am willing to pay $12,000”; 
in the phantom anchor absent-extreme condition: “I am willing to pay $11,000”; and in the 
phantom anchor absent-moderate condition: “I am willing to pay $12,000.”  
Counteroffer. Participants were asked to provide a counteroffer to the buyer. 
Perceptions of offerer’s benevolence. To gauge whether phantom anchors led to 
perceptions of benevolence, the primary questions participants answered were these: “The buyer 
tried to help me out in this negotiation” (1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strong agree); “Based on the 
limited information you have about the buyer, to what extent do you expect him to cooperate 
with you in this negotiation?” (1=Not at all, 7=A lot); “Based on the limited information you 
have about the buyer, to what extent do you expect him to work with you in this negotiation?” 
(1=Not at all, 7=A lot, α=0.71). 
Perceptions of offerer’s manipulativeness. To test the possible effects of phantom 
anchors on perceptions of manipulativeness, the primary questions participants answered were 
these: “The buyer is being manipulative with the way he made his offers in this negotiation”; 
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“The buyer is trying to take advantage of me”; and “The buyer was not honest in the way he 
made his offers” (1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree, α=0.85). 
Attention check. To test whether participants were paying attention, we included a 
question that read: “This is a question that is designed to see if you are paying attention. Do not 
answer this question.” 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analysis. Twenty-one participants failed our attention check question. An 
additional five participants provided counteroffers that reflected either a lack of attention or a 
lack of comprehension. For example, despite being in the role of the seller, one participant 
countered with $450 and another with $21. We excluded these twenty-six participants and 
conducted our analysis using the remaining 415 respondents. Means, standard deviations and 
bivariate correlations of variables used in Study 4 are reported in Table 3. 
Main analysis. 
Counteroffer. To test the effect of offers with versus without phantom anchors and the 
magnitude of these offers on counteroffers, we coded our independent variables as phantom 
anchor absent condition=-1, phantom anchor present condition=1 and moderate magnitude 
condition=-1, extreme magnitude condition=1. Since the person responding to the offers was a 
seller, less aggressive counteroffers (from their perspective) would be indicated by lower values. 
We then conducted a factorial Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), which produced two main 
effects but no interaction. The first main effect indicated that offers with phantom anchors led to 
less aggressive counteroffers than those without phantom anchors, F (1, 411) = 32.30, p <0.001, 
d=0.54, Mphantom present=12,221.12, SDphantom present=751.27; Mphantom absent=12,641.87, SDphantom 
absent=802.30. The second main effect indicated, as anchoring theory would suggest, that sellers 
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were anchored by the magnitude of the buyer’s offer. Those who received a moderate (i.e., 
higher) offer made a higher counteroffer than those who received an extreme (i.e., lower) offer, 
F (1, 411) = 30.22, p < .001, d=0.53, Mextreme=12,227.07, SDextreme=846.12; Mmoderate=12,634.05, 
SDmoderate=707.87. The interaction was not significant, F (1, 411) = 0.03, p = 0.89, meaning that 
the effectiveness of offers with versus without phantom anchors did not depend on extremity. 
Taken together, these results replicate the distributive advantage of phantom anchors.  
Perceptions of offerer’s benevolence. To test for the effect of phantom anchors on 
perceptions of benevolence (Hypothesis 2a), we reran the above ANOVA on the “perceptions of 
offerer’s benevolence” variable. This analysis did not yield a significant effect of the offer type 
variable, F (1, 411) = 1.04, p = 0.31. However, there was a significant main effect of offer 
magnitude, F (1, 411) = 15.26, p <0.001, d=0.40, such that moderate offers led to higher 
perceptions of benevolence than extreme offers, Mmoderate=4.67, SDmoderate=0.99, Mextreme=4.30, 
SDextreme=0.91. Finally, the interaction was not significant, F (1, 411) = 0.004, p =0.967. These 
results suggest that, in contrast to Hypothesis 2a, the combination of a phantom anchor with an 
actual offer did not influence perceptions of the offerer’s benevolence.   
                                                          
7 We also tested the effects of phantom anchors and offer magnitude on perceptions of manipulativeness and 
benevolence using measures that are aimed at gauging more general perceptions of the offerer. Specifically, the four 
items for perceptions of manipulativeness were, “To what extent do you think the buyer’s behavior can be described 
as manipulative, misleading, deceitful, deceptive” (1= Not at all, 5=Very much, α=0.96); and the four items for 
perceptions of benevolence were, “To what extent do you think the buyer’s behavior can be described as benevolent, 
altruistic, cooperative, helpful” (1= Not at all, 5=Very much, α=0.81). We first ran a factorial ANOVA with the 
offer type and the offer magnitude variables as the independent and perceptions of benevolence as the dependent 
variable. We observed only a main effect of the offer magnitude condition, F (1, 411) = 28.23, p <0.001, 
Mmoderate=2.65, SDmoderate=0.86, Mextreme=2.20, SDextreme=0.73, d=0.56. There was neither an effect of offer type, F (1, 
411) = 0.09, p=0.93 nor an interaction, F (1, 411) = 0.77, p =0.38. We then ran this analysis on perceptions of 
manipulativeness. Results were very similar to those with our main manipulativeness measure, such that there was a 
marginally significant effect of offer magnitude, F (1, 411) = 3.19, p =0.08 and a significant effect of offer type F 
(1, 411) = 70.73, p <0.001, but no interaction, F (1, 411) = 2.21, p =0.14. Moderate offers decreased perceptions of 
manipulativeness in relation to extreme offers, Mmoderate=1.67, SDmoderate=0.99, Mextreme=1.82, SDextreme=0.93, d=0.16, 
and phantom anchors led to higher perceptions of offerer’s manipulativeness, Mphantom present=2.11, SDphantom 
present=1.06, Mphantom absent=1.38, SDphantom absent=1.06, d=0.82.  
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Perceptions of offerer’s manipulativeness. To test for the effect of phantom anchors on 
perceptions of manipulativeness (Hypothesis 2b), we reran the above ANOVA once more, this 
time on the “perceptions of offerer’s manipulativeness” variable. The ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of offer type, F (1, 411) = 65.85, p <0.001, d=0.78, a significant effect of 
offer magnitude, F (1, 411) = 9.66, p =0.004, d=0.29, and no interaction, F (1, 411) = 0.47, p 
=0.49. Specifically, phantom anchors significantly increased perceptions of the offerer’s 
manipulativeness, Mphantom present=3.58, SDphantom present=1.34, Mphantom absent=2.58, SDphantom 
absent=1.21. Additionally, moderate offers led to lower perceptions of manipulativeness than 
extreme offers, Mmoderate=2.88, SDmoderate=1.31, Mextreme=3.27, SDextreme=0.40. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 2b, these results suggest that phantom anchors are perceived as manipulative. 
Inconsistent with the alternative explanation, these perceptions appeared to stem from the form 
or “phantomness” of the offer rather than its extremity.  
Suppression Analysis. So far, we observed that offers with phantom anchors led to less 
aggressive counteroffers than offers without them, but also increased perceptions of the offerer’s 
manipulativeness. Taken together, these results suggest that phantom anchors, despite 
successfully anchoring offer recipients and eliciting less aggressive counteroffers, also breed 
negative interpersonal perceptions. These results begin to support the mediation portion of the 
moderated mediation model in Figure 1, though we have not yet measured the proposed 
moderator (situational conditions portraying the combination of the phantom anchor and actual 
offer combination as a true concession). Thus, we sought to conduct a preliminary test of the 
mediation portion of the model. We should also note that, although this study includes a second 
independent variable (offer magnitude), we collapsed across the two levels of this variable based 
on the results reported above. 
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Since phantom anchors appear to have beneficial economic effects but generate negative 
interpersonal perceptions (which should dampen economic effects), the mediation pattern is 
more properly called suppression or inconsistent mediation. In a pattern of suppression, the sign 
of the indirect relationship is opposite the sign of the total relationship. To test that possibility, 
we used the PROCESS macro by Hayes (2017) to conduct a bootstrapping test with 10000 
resamples, with offer type as the independent variable, perceptions of offerer’s manipulativeness 
as the mediator, and counteroffer as the dependent variable. This analysis first revealed a 
significant and negative direct effect of the phantom anchor variable on counteroffers, B=-
265.45, SE=40.42, 95% CI -344.90, -186.00, indicating less aggressive counteroffers. Moreover, 
there was a significant and positive effect of perceptions of buyer manipulativeness on 
counteroffers, B=109.41, SE=29.53, 95% CI 51.37, 167.45, indicating that offers became more 
aggressive as perceptions of manipulativeness increased. Finally, the indirect effect involving the 
suppressor, i.e. perceptions of the offerer’s manipulativeness, was also significant and positive, 
B=55.08, SE=16.44, 95% CI 23.79, 88.49. The opposing signs on the relationships involving and 
not involving the mediator support suppression. Figure 2 depicts this analysis. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that phantom anchors set powerful anchors, 
influencing counteroffer values directly. This replicates our previous findings and supports 
Hypothesis 1. On the other hand, phantom anchors also seem to produce negative interpersonal 
perceptions of manipulativeness, thereby harming economic outcomes—albeit through a less 
direct path and less strongly than the anchoring effect. Coupled with the fact that phantom 
anchors did not seem to influence perceptions of benevolence, this pattern supports Hypothesis 
2b rather than 2a. Importantly, this study also argued against a potential alternative explanation: 
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that the extremity rather than the “phantomness” of an offer drives manipulativeness perceptions. 
Our results suggest that it is the “phantomness” of phantom anchors that seems manipulative.  
Study 5 
 Study 5 is a three-part study intended to delve deeper into interpersonal perceptions, 
explore potential moderators, and test our full moderated mediation model (Figure 1). Each part 
of the study tests one of the moderators predicted to influence whether offers with phantom 
anchors are perceived as true concessions: the presence versus absence of objective standards 
(Study 5a), competitiveness versus cooperativeness of the negotiation context (Study 5b), and 
bolstering versus backdown format of the offer (Study 5c). For consistency and comparability, 
all three parts of the study used the same context: a salary negotiation. 
Study 5a 
Study 5a again examines the effect of phantom anchors on perceptions of benevolence 
and/or manipulativeness. Additionally, it examines whether the presence of an objective standard 
(Fisher & Ury, 1981) that matches the phantom anchor, by portraying the real offer as a true 
concession, may increase perceptions of benevolence and/or reduce perceptions of 
manipulativeness, either of which could influence phantom anchors’ economic effects. Yet, our 
prior studies suggest that the economic effect of phantom anchors is unlikely to be eliminated.  
Study 5a Method 
Participants and design. We advertised the study on Prolific Academic for 400 
participants but ended up with 412 (Mage=33.57 SDage=11.10, 47.1 % women). Participants were 
all located in the United States and were native English speakers. They received $0.75 in 
exchange for their participation. The study contained two manipulated variables: offer type 
34 
 
(phantom anchor present versus phantom anchor absent) x objective standard (present versus 
absent) in a between-subjects factorial design. 
Procedure. 
 All three parts of Study 5 used a similar adaptation of a negotiation scenario from Ames 
and Mason (2015). We describe the scenario in detail here and discuss only the variants in 
Studies 5b and 5c. Participants imagined that they had been working as a temporary project 
manager for a construction company for the past six months. They learned that the company now 
wanted to hire them as a full-time, salaried employee and that they were about to negotiate the 
offer with the human resources director, Pat. The full scenario is in Appendix A. 
Manipulated and measured variables. 
Objective standard manipulation. Study 5a manipulated the presence of an objective 
standard by including a salary estimate from a job-hunting website. Specifically, in the objective 
standard present condition, prior to hearing Pat’s offer, participants read that: “Job websites like 
Monster.com indicate that people in similar positions, in similar companies, make about 
$55,000.” In the objective standard absent condition, they read: “Job websites like Monster.com 
have no information on the average salary of people in similar positions, in similar companies.”  
Offer type manipulation. We manipulated offer type via the way in which the human 
resource director, Pat, made the salary offer. In the phantom anchor present condition, Pat said: 
“We were planning on offering you $55,000 but we can do $60,000.” In the phantom anchor 
absent condition, Pat said: “We can offer you $60,000.”  
Counteroffer. Participants were asked to provide a counteroffer to Pat’s salary offer.  
Counteroffer reason. To make sure participants understood the negotiation and their 
role, we also asked participants to describe why they chose the counteroffer amount they did.  
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Perceptions of offerer’s benevolence. We measured perceptions of benevolence the same 
as in Study 4, though the items now referenced Pat, α=0.70.  
Perceptions of offerer’s manipulativeness. Perceptions of manipulativeness were also 
measured the same way in is Study 4, referencing Pat, α=0.81. 
Attention check. As in our previous studies, we embedded a question to test whether 
participants were paying attention: “This is a question to test if you are paying attention. Please 
do not answer this question.” 
Study 5a Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analysis. Twenty-three participants failed the attention check question. As a 
secondary check on participants’ attention, we looked through the counteroffers and their 
accompanying reasons. Five additional participants provided counteroffers and reasons that 
clearly reflected a lack of either comprehension or attention. For example, one participant 
provided a counteroffer of $7 and said, “Because I like it!” Another participant offered $50,000, 
which is $10,000 lower than the initial offer and said, “I feel it’s fair.” We excluded the confused 
or inattentive participants and performed data analyses with the remaining 384. Means, standard 
deviations and bivariate correlations of variables for Study 5a are reported in Table 4. 
Main analysis. 
Our moderated mediation model suggests that phantom anchors will elicit less aggressive 
counteroffers (Hypothesis 1) along with perceptions of either benevolence (Hypothesis 2a) or 
manipulativeness (Hypothesis 2b), which will be moderated by situational conditions portraying 
the offer with phantom anchor as a true concession (Hypothesis 3). We first test each hypothesis 
using ANOVAs. Then, we test the full moderated mediation model. 
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Counteroffer. Since the person responding to the offers in this and the other parts of 
Study 5 was a job candidate, Hypothesis 1 suggests that offers with phantom anchors should 
elicit lower counteroffers, which are less aggressive from a candidate’s perspective. To test 
Hypothesis 1, we conducted a two-way ANOVA with offer type condition (phantom anchor 
absent=-1, phantom anchor present=1) and objective standard condition (objective standard 
absent=-1, objective standard present=1) as independent variables and counteroffer as the 
dependent variable. Consistent with the hypothesis, the analysis resulted in a main effect of offer 
type condition, F (1, 380) = 31.54, p <0.001, d=0.46. Additionally, it produced a main effect of 
the objective standard condition, F (1, 380) = 77.09, p <0.001, d=0.74 and an interaction, F (1, 
380) = 6.46, p =0.01, η2=0.02. As suggested by Hypothesis 1, offers with phantom anchors 
elicited less aggressive counteroffers than offers without phantom anchors, Mphantom 
present=63,856.77, SDphantom present=3889.51, Mphantom absent=66,365.49, SDphantom absent=5688.59. 
Also, consistent with basic theory about objective standards, job candidates who learned of an 
objective standard countered less aggressively (Mobjective standard present=62,983.35, SDobjective standard 
present=5223.19) than those who did not (Mobjective standard absent=67,216.87, SDobjective standard 
absent=6208.56), F (1, 380) = 77.09, p <0.001, d=0.74.  
We conducted tests of simple effects to decompose the interaction. Results indicated that 
offers with phantom anchors elicited significantly less aggressive counteroffers when 
accompanied by an objective standard (Mobjective standard present=62,142.05, SDobjective standard 
present=3966.78) than when not (Mobjective standard absent=65,307.69, SDobjective standard absent=5715.04), 
F= 19.44, p <0.001, d=0.64. This effect also emerged for offers without phantom anchors, 
Mobjective standard present=63,702.14, SDobjective standard present=3691.41, Mobjective standard absent=69,447.81, 
SDobjective standard absent=6044.04, F= 64.14, p <0.001, d=1.14. As the effect sizes demonstrate, 
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however, the effect was weaker for offers with phantom anchors, hinting that the anchoring 
benefits of such offers are less susceptible to situational influences compared to offers without 
phantom anchors. This observation is in line with our prior findings documenting the strength of 
the distributive advantage of phantom anchors. 
Perceptions of offerer’s benevolence. Hypothesis 2a posits that phantom anchors may 
increase perceptions of benevolence, and Hypothesis 3a that situational factors like objective 
standards may amplify this relationship. These predictions amount to a main effect of offer type 
as well as an interaction between the offer type and objective standard variables. To test this 
prediction, we ran a factorial ANOVA with the offer type and objective standards variables as 
the independent and perceptions of benevolence as the dependent variable. Results included only 
a main effect of the objective standard condition, indicating that objective standards increased 
perceived benevolence, Mobjective standard present=4.96, SDobjective standard present=1.07, Mobjective standard 
absent=4.08, SDobjective standard absent=1.07, F (1, 380) = 71.82, p <0.001, d=0.82. Neither offer type, F 
(1, 380) = 2.47, p = 0.12, nor the interaction, F (1, 380) = 0.19, p =0.66, was significant. 
Perceptions of offerer’s manipulativeness. Similarly, Hypothesis 2b suggests that 
phantom anchors may generate perceptions of manipulativeness, but Hypothesis 3 suggests that 
objective standards may dampen such perceptions. To test these predictions, we reran the above 
ANOVA on perceptions of offerer’s manipulativeness. Results included two main effects and an 
interaction. Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, the main effect of phantom anchors indicated that 
they increased perceptions of manipulativeness, F (1,380) = 17.71, p <0.001, d=0.45, Mphantom 
present=3.44, SDphantom present=1.46, Mphantom absent=2.81, SDphantom absent=1.34. On the other hand, the 
main effect of objective standards indicated that these standards decreased perceptions of 
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manipulativeness, Mobjective standard present=2.70, SDobjective standard present=1.41, Mobjective standard 
absent=3.55, SDobjective standard absent=1.33, F (1, 380) = 35.45, p <0.001, d=0.62.  
Moreover, there was an interaction between offer type and objective standard, F (1, 380) 
= 6.46, p = 0.01. Tests of the simple effects underlying the interaction revealed that, for offers 
with phantom anchors, the presence of an objective standard significantly reduced perceptions of 
manipulativeness, Mobjective standard present=2.83, SDobjective standard present=1.43, Mobjective standard 
absent=3.97, SDobjective standard absent=1.27, F= 35.47, p <0.001, d=0.84. This effect, though weaker, 
also emerged for offers without phantom anchors, Mobjective standard present=2.59, SDobjective standard 
present=1.40, Mobjective standard absent=3.06, SDobjective standard absent=1.22, F= 6.06, p =0.01, d=0.36. 
Taken together, our findings on perceptions of benevolence and manipulativeness support 
Hypothesis 2b (rather than Hypothesis 2a) as well as Hypothesis 3.  
Moderated mediation analysis. Finally, we sought to test the full moderated mediation 
model collectively implied by our hypotheses (Figure 1). Given the significant effect of offers 
with phantom anchors on perceived manipulativeness, we tested a model involving that mediator 
first (using Version 3 of Hayes’ [2017] PROCESS Model 7). In support of the predicted model, 
the confidence interval for the indirect effect of manipulativeness did not include zero [331.42, 
889.98] in the objective standard absent condition but did include zero in the objective standard 
present condition [-101.56, 449.79]. Additionally, the confidence interval for the overall model 
did not include zero [-782.16, -96.73], providing support for the predicted pattern of moderated 
mediation (with manipulativeness as the mediator). Figure 3 depicts these results. 
Despite the null results for benevolence reported above, we also tested the moderated 
mediation model with perceptions of benevolence as the mediator. Consistent with the null 
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results, confidence intervals for the indirect effects [CIobjective standard absent -464.74, 196.68; 
CIobjective standard present -548.75, 72.05] and overall model [-556.11, 352.10] all included zero.  
Taken together, results of Study 5a support the prediction that phantom anchors have a 
strong anchoring effect (Hypothesis 1), despite eliciting negative interpersonal perceptions of 
manipulativeness (Hypothesis 2b). The presence of an objective standard, though, seems to 
reduce or eliminate these negative perceptions (Hypothesis 3).  
Study 5b 
Study 5b examines another potential moderator of interpersonal perceptions: the 
competitiveness versus cooperativeness of the negotiation situation. Like an objective standard, a 
cooperative negotiation seems likely to cast an offer with a phantom anchor as a true concession. 
Study 5b Method 
Participants and design. We advertised the study for 440 participants on Prolific 
Academic but ended up with 439 (Mage=33.36 SDage=11.34, 47.8 % women). Participants were 
all located in the U.S. and were native speakers of English. They received $0.95 for their 
participation. We should note that we prevented participants who had taken Study 5a from taking 
this study due to its similarity. The study contained two manipulated variables: offer type 
(phantom anchor present versus phantom anchor absent) and negotiation type (competitive 
versus cooperative) in a between-subjects factorial design. 
Procedure. 
 This study’s procedure was exactly the same as Study 5a’s except that no information 
about the presence or absence of an objective standard was provided, and the competitiveness 
versus cooperativeness of the negotiation was manipulated as follows.  
Manipulated and measured variables. 
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Negotiation type manipulation. We manipulated negotiation type by including 
information about how the human resources manager, Pat, behaved. In the cooperative 
negotiation condition, participants read that, “Pat acts very cooperatively, demonstrates great 
concern about your interests, and expresses a strong desire to make an offer with a reasonable 
salary.” In the competitive negotiation condition, they read: “Pat acts very competitively, 
demonstrates little concern about your interests, and expresses no desire to make an offer with a 
reasonable salary.”  
Offer type manipulation. Our offer type manipulation was identical to Study 5a.  
Counteroffer, counteroffer reason, perceptions of manipulativeness, perceptions of 
benevolence and attention check. These measures were also identical to Study 5a. 
Study 5b Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analysis. Before moving on to the main analysis, we checked whether any 
participants needed to be excluded due to lack of attention or comprehension. Twenty-one 
participants failed the attention check question. As in our previous study, an additional six 
participants made counteroffers or gave rationales indicating that they were not paying attention 
and/or did not understand the instructions. We excluded these twenty-seven participants and 
conducted all further analysis on the remaining 412. Means, standard deviations and bivariate 
correlations are reported in Table 5. 
Main analysis. 
Counteroffer. Hypothesis 1 suggests that offers with phantom anchors should elicit lower 
(less aggressive) counteroffers. Basic negotiation theory would suggest that cooperative 
negotiations should have the same effect. We did not identify an a priori reason to expect an 
interaction. To test these predictions, we conducted a two-way ANOVA with offer type condition 
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(phantom anchor absent=-1, phantom anchor present=1) and negotiation type condition 
(competitive=-1, cooperative=1) as independent variables and counteroffer as the dependent 
variable. As expected, results revealed the predicted main effect of offer type, F (1, 408) = 52.34, 
p <0.001, d=0.71, such that offers with phantom anchors led to less aggressive counteroffers, 
Mphantom present=63,827.01, SDphantom present=5745.16, Mphantom absent=71,461.69, SDphantom 
absent=9690.04. Additionally, the ANOVA produced the expected main effect of negotiation type, 
F (1, 408) = 14.30, p <0.001, d=0.37, such that participants operating in a cooperative setting 
made less aggressive counteroffers than those in a competitive setting, Mcooperative=67,059.71, 
SDcooperative=3889.51, Mcompetitive=70,092.23, SDcompetitive=9681.20. Finally, we did not observe an 
interaction, F (1, 380) = 0.32, p =0.57.  
Perceptions of offerer’s benevolence. Hypothesis 2a implies a main effect of offer type 
on perceptions of benevolence, and Hypothesis 3 posits that a cooperative negotiation should 
strengthen this relationship. It is also likely that a cooperative (versus competitive) negotiation 
would elicit and heighten perceptions of benevolence. These predictions amount to a main effect 
of offer type and negotiation type variables as well as an interaction between the two on 
perceptions of benevolence. To test these predictions, we reran the above ANOVA on 
perceptions of benevolence. Results indicated a main effect of the offer type variable, F (1,408) 
= 6.20, p =0.01, d=0.21, Mphantom present=4.07, SDphantom present=1.39, Mphantom absent=3.77, SDphantom 
absent=1.41 and a main effect of the negotiation type variable, F (1,408) = 257.3, p <0.001, 
d=1.58, Mcooperative=4.80, SDcooperative=1.03, Mcompetitive=3.06, SDcompetitive=1.17. However, the 
interaction was not significant, F (1,408) = 1.28, p =0.26. These results provide support for 
Hypothesis 2a but not for Hypothesis 3 (in the context of benevolence).  
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Perceptions of offerer’s manipulativeness. Hypothesis 2b implies a main effect of offer 
type on perceptions of manipulativeness, whereas Hypothesis 3 suggests an interaction indicating 
that a cooperative negotiation moderates these perceptions. It also stands to reason that a 
cooperative negotiation should elicit lower manipulativeness perceptions (a main effect). 
Rerunning the above two-way ANOVA on perceptions of offerer’s manipulativeness, we 
observed these two main effects and interaction. In support of Hypothesis 2b, recipients of offers 
with phantom anchors viewed their negotiation partners as more manipulative than recipients of 
offers without phantom anchors, F (1,408) = 23.58, p <0.001, d=0.41, Mphantom present=4.43, 
SDphantom present=1.44, Mphantom absent=3.81, SDphantom absent=1.57. Additionally, partners were viewed 
as less manipulative in the cooperative than the competitive setting, Mcooperative=3.51, 
SDcooperative=1.50, Mcompetitive=4.74, SDcompetitive=1.31, F (1, 408) = 87.32, p <0.001, d=0.87.  
To interpret the interaction between offer type and negotiation type, F (1, 412) = 11.42, 
p=0.001, we conducted simple effects tests. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, they revealed that 
offers with phantom anchors were viewed as significantly less manipulative in the context of a 
cooperative negotiation, Mcooperative=4.04, SDcooperative=1.43 than a competitive negotiation, 
Mcompetitive=4.84, SDcompetitive=1.35, F= 18.23, p < 0.001, d=0.58, though this difference was 
smaller than the difference for offers without phantom anchors, Mcooperative=2.94, 
SDcooperative=1.38 Mcompetitive=4.64, SDcompetitive=1.27, F= 79.04, p < 0.001, d=1.28.  
Moderated mediation analysis. We next tested our full model using PROCESS Model 7 
(Hayes, 2017), starting with perceptions of manipulativeness. In this analysis, the confidence 
interval for the indirect effect of manipulativeness did not include zero [653.46, 1535.78] in the 
competitive condition but did include zero in the cooperative condition [-156.49, 559.64]. 
Moreover, the confidence interval for the overall model did not include zero [355.49, 1438.32]. 
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These results support the overall model, depicted in Figure 4, with manipulativeness as the 
mediator.   
We then tested perceptions of benevolence as the mediator in a similar model. In this 
analysis, the confidence interval did not include zero [-617.09, -65.31] in the cooperative 
condition and did in the competitive condition [-394.10, 114.87]. However, the confidence 
interval for the overall model included zero, [-146.20, 578.69], indicating that the moderated 
mediation model was not supported with benevolence as the mediator.  
This study showed that offers with phantom anchors influenced counteroffers irrespective 
of the cooperative or competitive nature of the negotiation, supporting Hypothesis 1. Phantom 
anchors also increased perceptions of benevolence (Hypothesis 2a) and manipulativeness 
(Hypothesis 2b), though manipulativeness perceptions were reduced in the cooperative 
negotiation (Hypothesis 3). Finally, when examining the full moderated mediation model, we 
only found support for perceptions of manipulativeness as the mediator. Along with Study 5a, 
this study provides converging evidence that phantom anchors afford economic advantages but 
send disadvantageous interpersonal signals, albeit signals that situational factors can reduce. 
Study 5c 
Study 5c looks at another potential moderator of interpersonal perceptions: the bolstering 
versus backdown format of the offer. As noted, Ames and Mason (2015) studied range offers, 
distinguishing between bolstering range offers (true intended figure = less ambitious number in 
range) and backdown ranges (true intended figure = more ambitious number in range). For 
example, they indicated that, “a seller asking ‘$7200 to $7600’ rather than ‘$7200’” would be a 
bolstering range offer whereas “a seller asking ‘$6800 to $7200’ rather than ‘$7200’” (Ames and 
Mason, 2015, p.256) would be a backdown range offer.  It is possible to apply this typology to 
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phantom anchors, as the phantom anchor and actual offer could be conceptualized as two ends of 
a range. A situation in which the true intended offer is known to match the actual offer would 
resemble a bolstering range offer, while a situation in which the true intended offer is known to 
match the phantom anchor would resemble a backdown range offer. In line with Ames and 
Mason (2015), we label the former configuration a “bolstering phantom” and the latter a 
“backdown phantom.” To demonstrate these possibilities more clearly, consider a situation in 
which it is known that a seller truly intends to make a $7200 offer for an item. The statement, “I 
was going to ask for $7600 but can do $7200” would be a bolstering phantom since the true 
intended offer matches the actual offer, which the phantom anchor bolsters. On the other hand, if 
it was known that the seller’s true intended offer was $7600, we would categorize the same 
statement as a backdown phantom since the seller has backed down from the intended offer to 
$7200.  
Consistent with Ames and Mason (2015), we predict that a backdown phantom will be 
seen as more of a true concession, and thus as more benevolent and/or less manipulative than a 
bolstering phantom. Additionally, and consistent with our prior studies, we expect the economic 
advantages of phantom anchors to persist across both types of phantoms. 
Method 
Participants and design. We advertised the study on Amazon Mturk for 400 participants 
but ended up with 399 (Mage=37.64, SDage=11.32, 49.6 % women). Participants, who were all 
located in the United States, received $0.75 for their participation. In designing the study, we 
sought to compare bolstering versus backdown phantoms as well as offers with and without 
phantom anchors, but also to keep the actual offer the same across offer types (to test for 
anchoring). This involved the creation of four discrete offer conditions, which we manipulated 
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between-subjects: bolstering phantom, backdown phantom, bolstering control, and backdown 
control. For clarity, we describe our conditions using these names. However, these four 
conditions are equivalent to the factorial design: 2 (offer type: phantom present versus absent) x 
2 (true intended offer: $55,000 versus $60,000), and we conduct all analyses accordingly for 
consistency with Study 5a and 5b.  
Procedure. 
 We used the same job negotiation scenario as in Studies 5a and 5b, without any mention 
of objective standards or cooperativeness / competitiveness. 
Manipulated and measured variables. 
Phantom anchor type manipulation. In the bolstering phantom condition, participants 
read that they had researched the company and were “pretty confident that Pat would like to offer 
you $60,000.” In the negotiation, Pat said: “We were planning on offering you $55,000 but we 
can do $60,000.” In the backdown phantom condition, participants believed that Pat intended to 
offer them $55,000, and they read the exact same statement.  
In the bolstering control condition, Pat’s true intended offer was matched to the true 
intended offer in bolstering phantom condition ($60,000), and Pat said: “We can offer you 
$60,000.” In the backdown control condition, Pat’s true intended offer was matched to the true 
intended offer in backdown phantom condition ($55,000), and participants received a $60,000 
offer. In sum, participants received a $60,000 offer across conditions, but we manipulated both 
the presence versus absence of a phantom anchor and Pat’s true intended offer to create four 
conditions, which were equivalent to a 2 (offer type: phantom present or absent) x 2 (true 
intended offer: $55,000 or $60,000).  
Counteroffer. Participants were asked to provide a counteroffer to Pat’s salary offer.  
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Perceptions of offerer’s benevolence. Our measure of benevolence was the same as in 
Studies 5a and 5b, α=0.78. 
Perceptions of offerer’s manipulativeness. Our measure of manipulativeness was the 
same as in Studies 5a and 5b, α=0.84. 
Attention check. We used the same attention check question as in Studies 5a and 5b. 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analysis. Seven participants who failed the attention check question were 
excluded from subsequent analyses. This left us with 392 participants. Means, standard 
deviations and bivariate correlations for this study are reported in Table 6. 
Main analysis. 
Counteroffer. Hypothesis 1 suggests that the economic advantage of offers with (versus 
without) phantom anchors should persist regardless of their bolstering or backdown format. To 
test this prediction, we first coded the offer type variable as phantom anchor absent=-1, phantom 
anchor present=1, and the true intended offer variable as: $60,000=-1 and $55,000=1. We then 
conducted a two-way ANOVA with the offer type and true intended offer conditions as the 
independent, and the counteroffer as the dependent variable. This analysis yielded a main effect 
of the offer type variable, F (1, 388) = 29.85, p <0.001, d=0.56, a main effect of the true intended 
offer variable, F (1, 388) = 16.13, p <0.001, d=0.40, and a significant interaction, F (1, 388) = 
7.72, p =0.006. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we observed that offers with phantom anchors 
produced less aggressive counteroffers than offers without them, Mphantom present=62,740.00, 
SDphantom present=3911.06, Mphantom absent=65,296.08, SDphantom absent=5128.42. As one might expect, 
counteroffers were also less aggressive when the negotiation counterpart’s the true intended offer 
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was $55,000, Mintended$55K=63,029.26, SDintended$55K=3720.93, Mintended$60K=64,879.14, 
SDintended$60K=5337.64. 
 To decompose the interaction, we conducted simple effects tests, which revealed that, for 
offers without phantom anchors, participants made significantly less aggressive counteroffers 
when they knew the true intended offer was $55,000 (i.e., in the backdown control condition), 
Mintended$55K=63,662.93, SDintended$55K=3424.30, than when they knew the true intended offer was 
$60,000 (i.e., in the bolstering control condition), Mintended$60K=66,707.23, SDintended$60K=5898.72, 
F= 22.56, p < 0.001, d=0.63. For offers with phantom anchors, however, there was no difference 
in counteroffers between bolstering and backdown phantoms, F= 0.79, p =0.38. 
Perceptions of offerer’s benevolence. In line with Hypothesis 2a and 3, we examined 
whether bolstering versus backdown phantoms would influence perceptions of benevolence and 
whether these perceptions would be moderated by the format of the offer. Rerunning the above 
ANOVA on these perceptions, results revealed only a significant effect of the true intended offer 
variable, F (1, 388) = 17.12, p <0.001, d=0.42, such that participants viewed their negotiation 
counterpart as more benevolent when the true intended offer was $55,000, Mintended$55K=5.19, 
SDintended$55K=1.06, rather than $60,000, Mintended$60K=4.75, SDintended$60K=1.05. This is 
understandable since actual offer was $60,000 in both cases. There was not a significant effect of 
offer type, F (1, 388) = 0.09, p =0.76, nor an interaction, F (1, 388) = 1.05, p =0.31.  
Perceptions of offerer’s manipulativeness. Hypothesis 2b suggests that offers with 
phantom anchors would be viewed as more manipulative than offers without phantom anchors, 
but Hypothesis 3 suggests that backdown phantoms would be seen as less manipulative than 
bolstering phantoms. To test these predictions, we first reran the above ANOVA on perceptions 
of manipulativeness and observed a main effect of offer type, F (1, 388) = 37.74, p <0.001, 
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d=0.60, the true intended offer, F (1, 388) = 17.03, p <0.001, d=0.38 and a significant 
interaction, F (1, 388) = 7.57, p =0.006. Specifically, offers with phantom anchors were viewed 
as more manipulative than offers without them, Mphantom present= 3.40, SDphantom present=1.50, 
Mphantom absent=2.54, SDphantom absent=1.37. Morever, a true intended offer of $60,000 was seen as 
more manipulative than that of $55,000, Mintended$55K=2.69, SDintended$55K=1.33, Mintended$60K=3.25, 
SDintended$60K=1.59. More importantly, tests of the simple effects revealed that backdown 
phantoms (i.e., when the true intended offer matched the phantom anchor) were seen as 
significantly less manipulative than bolstering phantoms (i.e., when the true intended offer 
matched the actual offer), Mintended$55K=2.91, SDintended$55K=1.34, Mintended$60K=3.88, 
SDintended$60K=1.50, F= 24.19, p < 0.001, d=0.68. There was no difference between the backdown 
and bolstering control conditions, F= 0.92, p =0.34. This analysis supports Hypotheses 2b and 3. 
Moderated mediation analysis. Akin to Studies 5a and 5b, we tested our full mediation 
model with the bolstering versus backdown format of the phantom anchor as the moderator. We 
used Version 3 of Hayes (2017) PROCESS macro Model 7 to conduct a moderated mediation 
analysis, first with manipulativeness as the mediator. Results indicated the indirect effects at both 
levels of the true intended offer variable had confidence intervals excluding zero [CI$55,000 13.06, 
308.65; CI$60,000 74.22, 630.77], supporting the presence of indirect effects. Additionally, the 
overall model had a confidence interval excluding zero [-448.36, -28.36], providing support for 
the overall pattern of moderated mediation, with manipulativeness as the mediator (Figure 5). 
We also tested this model with perceptions of benevolence as the mediator, but neither 
the indirect effects [CI$55,000 -343.46, 471.80, CI$60,000 -302.22, 482.67] nor the overall model [-
526.32, 580.49] had a confidence interval excluding zero. 
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This study provided further evidence that offers with phantom anchors produce an 
economic advantage but also elicit perceptions of manipulativeness, which can be attenuated by 
formatting the phantom similarly to a backdown range. Yet, perceptions of manipulativeness 
were again insufficient to eliminate the economic advantage afforded by phantom anchors. 
Additionally, we would note the consistent absence of benevolence perceptions, in opposition to 
Hypothesis 2a. At least in the current contexts, our participants rarely appeared to see phantom 
anchors as indicative of the offerer’s benevolence. Overall, offer recipients seemed to perceive 
little benevolence and some manipulativeness in the use of phantom anchors, but 
manipulativeness perceptions were insufficient to counteract the economic advantage afforded 
by those anchors, especially under situational conditions signaling a true concession.  
General Discussion 
In this paper, we introduced the concept of phantom anchors in negotiation, which are 
retracted and aggressive figures attached to real and less aggressive offers. Our first study 
documented the spontaneous use of phantom anchors in negotiation, while our next four studies 
collectively showed that these anchors afford an economic advantage due to anchoring (a 
“phantom anchor effect”), but only at the expense of interpersonal perceptions. Specifically, our 
findings suggest that negotiators using phantom anchors received more favorable counteroffers 
and obtained better settlement prices but were also viewed as more manipulative than those who 
did not use phantom anchors. Indeed, in a single paper meta-analysis (McShane & Brockenholt, 
2018) of our studies, we actually find that offers with phantom anchors led to 4.5% less 
aggressive counteroffers than offers without phantom anchors (95% CI: 2.5%-6.4%) but also 
increased perceptions of manipulativeness by 0.58 points on a 7-point scale (95% CI: 0.36-0.78, 
please see Appendix B for more details on this analysis). As Study 5 demonstrates, however, 
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these manipulativeness perceptions can be reduced by situational conditions portraying the 
combined phantom anchor and actual offer as a true concession. We believe these findings offer 
some notable contributions to theory and practice. 
Contributions to Negotiation Theory 
By showing that offers with the same actual offers can elicit divergent counteroffers, our 
work contributes to the interpersonal influence and persuasion framework in negotiation, with 
interpersonal influence and persuasion defined as “the effort to positively influence another 
party’s attitude toward a given idea or proposition without changing the incentives or objective 
information set of the other party” (Malhotra & Bazerman, 2008, pg. 512). In line with this 
framework, phantom anchors, despite being a relatively “cheap” form of talk, do seem to anchor 
offer recipients. Thus, offers with phantom anchors persuade offer recipients to accept less 
favorable terms (which are also more favorable for the offerer in a distributive negotiation).  
Furthermore, our findings advance the literature on anchoring effects in negotiation (e.g., 
Adair, et al.,2007; Ames & Mason, 2015; Janiszewski & Uy, 2008; Loschelder, et al.2016; 
Loschelder, et al., 2014; Schaerer, et al., 2016; Schaerer, et al, 2015) by documenting the effects 
of retracted figures as anchors. We find it striking that, although the figure mentioned in the 
phantom anchor is explicitly retracted (and perhaps was never being offered), it still influences 
counteroffers and settlement prices in favor of the offerer. In this way, our findings also 
contribute to an understudied area within the work on anchoring in negotiation: the effect of 
multiple anchors on counteroffers and perceptions (cf. Ames & Mason, 2015; Whyte & 
Sebenius, 1997). While the literature on first offers as anchors has greatly enriched our 
understanding of anchoring in bargaining contexts, negotiators are exposed and attend to 
numerous figures during a negotiation. Thus, it is critical to understand which of these figures 
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serve as alternative anchors and subsequently influence negotiators’ perceptions of and behavior 
toward one another. We believe the current findings advance the literature in this direction, e.g., 
by complementing work on poor alternatives as anchors (Schaerer et al., 2015).  
While phantom anchors afford immediate economic gains through anchoring, they also 
appear to carry a distinct interpersonal cost. In Studies 4 and 5, recipients of offers with (versus 
without) phantom anchors viewed their counterparts as more manipulative, despite the apparent 
“discount” being offered relative to the phantom anchor. Apparently, offer recipients “saw 
through” the phantom anchor, diagnosing it as a manipulative tactic as opposed to a benevolent 
concession, even while insufficiently adjusting from the anchor. This finding raises several 
interesting questions that could seed intriguing lines of research: For example, do perceptions of 
manipulativeness arise from the fact that the phantom anchor is now retracted or the fact that the 
discounted real offer was supposedly unavailable at the time the phantom was formulated?  
More generally, our findings also appear to move the nascent literature on 
manipulativeness forward. In a context laden with skepticism and mistrust like negotiation 
(Sinaceur, 2010), individuals probably look to every word to determine whether their counterpart 
is being manipulative. Indeed, guarding against manipulativeness is a predominating concern of 
negotiation practitioners. Yet, negotiation research has not often considered which types of 
statements negotiators perceive to be manipulative. While we know that negotiators consider 
overtly deceptive behaviors like misrepresentation or false promises unethical (Robinson, 
Lewicki, & Donohue, 2000), we do not know which of the many more subtle and presumably 
more common influence tactics that negotiators use are seen as manipulative. What about tactics 
like flattery, schmoozing, or displays of excessively positive emotion?  
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Our research takes an important step in the direction of understanding tactics perceived to 
be manipulative, presenting a specific and apparently rather common tactic, the phantom anchor, 
with both economic gains and relational costs. This apparent trade-off means that real negotiators 
should use phantom anchors with caution. Possibly, negotiators should even avoid using 
phantom anchors unless they view a negotiation as purely distributive and/or can point to 
situational factors like objective standards that would justify the anchor’s validity. More work on 
the full suite of manipulative tactics and their associated relational and economic implications, 
along with the ways that real negotiators manage the inherent trade-off, is surely needed.  
Overall, it is intriguing to note that phantom anchors consistently influenced negative 
rather than positive interpersonal perceptions (with the exception of Study 5b, where phantom 
anchors influenced both). While it seems perfectly plausible that the combination of a phantom 
anchor and actual offer could be perceived in positive terms, our participants consistently 
diagnosed such combinations as attempts to manipulate. We suspect this relates to the difficulty 
of increasing any positive perceptions in a context already laden with mistrust (Sinaceur, 2010). 
In other words, the negotiation context itself may prevent negotiators from reaching many 
positive perceptions, even in reaction to seemingly benevolent behaviors. Given the critical role 
of trust in negotiation (Lewicki & Polin, 2013), research into heightening positive perceptions 
rather than just mitigating negative perceptions is still a priority.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
The trade-off between economic and interpersonal outcomes in this research begs the 
question of whether it is possible to use phantom anchors and maintain a distributive advantage 
without sacrificing the interpersonal relationship. Our moderated mediation results shed some 
light on this issue, suggesting that negative interpersonal perceptions can be reduced but are 
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difficult to eliminate entirely. As an important avenue for future research, we wonder whether 
the explanations used to justify phantom anchors might help eliminate such perceptions 
completely. Though we do not view the provision of an explanation as an inherent property of 
offers with phantom anchors, certain types of explanations may play an important role in 
decreasing the negative interpersonal perceptions associated with this strategy. For example, 
rationales speaking to one’s constraints (Lee & Ames, 2017) or explaining why the phantom 
anchor is retracted may be successful in eliciting the distributive advantage without incurring 
interpersonal costs. We would welcome future research into these possibilities. 
Other interesting avenues for future research relate to the timing and nuances of phantom 
anchors as a strategy. In this paper, we examined offers with phantom anchors at relatively early 
points in the negotiation process. Despite evidence that phantom anchors afforded an economic 
advantage in all of these settings, both the first offer and the first counteroffer come relatively 
early in a negotiation. Thus, the efficacy of phantom anchors at later stages of a negotiation 
remains an interesting and open question. On the one hand, early phantoms might be more potent 
for the same reasons that first offers are so potent: they set the tone for all subsequent 
adjustments (e.g., Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). On the other hand, a phantom anchor later in 
the negotiation might generate fewer perceptions of manipulativeness, as the offerer could 
explain the phantom anchor as an intention formed before talking to the offer recipient (or, 
equivalently, the actual offer as a concession justified by the conversation). Future research 
could usefully examine these timing-related issues as well as other intriguing possibilities. 
Conclusion 
The current research offers a useful point-of-entry into the fascinating and potentially 
important world of retracted yet still-mentioned figures in negotiation. Retracted as they might 
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be, phantom anchors appear quite relevant to the responses of offer recipients, guiding their 
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Appendix A: Study 5a Materials 
Imagine that you have spent the last 6 months working as a temporary, part-time project 
manager for a company that makes construction materials. The company has about 50 
employees. In this role, you have overseen new initiatives, communicated with customers, and 
coordinated the work of the production staff. According to the feedback you received, you have 
done an excellent job. 
The company recently told you that they would like to hire you as a full-time, salaried 
employee—something you’ve been hoping for. You are excited about the opportunity but would 
like to make sure you negotiate a reasonable salary. Jobs websites like Monster.com indicate that 
people in similar positions, at similar companies in the area, make about $55,000 / Jobs websites 
like Monster.com have no information on the average salary of people in similar positions, at 
similar companies in the area. 
You are now meeting with Pat, the human resources director for the company. In your 
meeting, Pat describes the position and comes around to salary, saying: “We can offer you 
$60,000.” / “We were planning on offering $55,000, but we can offer you $60,000.” 
Appendix B: Single Paper Meta-analysis 
To afford a sense for the overall strength of our effects, we conducted a single paper 
meta-analysis (SPM) following the recommendations of McShane and Bockenholt (2017). In 
accordance with their method, which requires that all dependent variables use the same scale and 
have similar values (Personal communication from McShane & Brockenholt, 2018), we 
transformed all of our focal dependent variables to be on the same scale. Specifically, we 
computed a variable measuring the percentage difference between the given offer (with phantom 
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present or absent) and counteroffer.  For example, if a buyer stated that, “I was planning on 
offering $10,000 but I can do $11,000”, and a seller participant countered with $11,500, the 
percentage difference would be (11,000-11,500)/11,000 (a 4.5% divergence from the 
counterpart’s offer). Based on our findings, we would expect this divergence to be lower, 
signaling less aggressive counteroffers, for offers with versus without phantom anchors. In 
addition to the counteroffer, we also examined perceptions of manipulativeness in this meta-
analysis, using the original scales. Overall, our dataset included Studies 2, 3a, 4, 5a, 5b, 5c from 
the paper as well as three additional studies that are not reported in the paper but include both of 
these variables. We could not include Study 3b in this analysis since we did not have sufficiently 
reliable information on the first offer.   
The SPM revealed that, across nine studies, offers with phantom anchors lead to 4.5% 
less aggressive counteroffers than offers without phantom anchors (95% CI: 2.5%-6.4%, p 
<0.001). Similarly, offers with phantom anchors increased perceptions of manipulativeness by 
0.58 scale points (95% CI: 0.36-0.78, p <0.001) on a 7-point scale. These findings are especially 
notable since they do not adjust for the moderating conditions measured in Studies 5a-5c, 
suggesting that phantom anchors consistently and strongly anchor the counterpart, sending 
signals of manipulativeness. 
 
 
 
